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6 The normative significance of the 
individual in economics 
Freedom, dignity, and human rights 
John B. Davis 
Neoclassical economists have long employed the fact-value distinction to 
advance one set of moral values for economics at the expense of all others 
under the false cover of value-neutrality. I term this stage in the history of 
the distinction its creative phase reflecting its successful use in creating one 
dominant set of values for economics. But we now seem to find ourselves 
in the midst of an historical transition in economics itself with neoclassical 
economics being increasingly pushed aside by an array of new research 
programs that bear little or no resemblance to it (Davis 2006) . Thus, in 
what may be a recurring cycle, the fact-value distinction appears to have 
entered upon a qualitatively different chapter in its history, though one 
ultimately no less misleading than the last. I term this its destructive phase 
in which neoclassicism's value commitments are exposed and its reputa-
tion as a value-neutral science rejected in arguments made by proponents 
of the new research programs, each of which is said to be value-neutral but 
each of which like neoclassicism seeks ultimately to advance new sets of 
values for economics under the false cover of value-neutrality. 
Of course, those who reject the fact-value distinction are neither bound 
by this cycle of deception and manipulation , nor precluded from reasoned 
discourse about values in economics. My goal here, then , is to provide one 
diagnosis of the current destructive phase of the fact-value distinction in 
terms of the breakdown of the neoclassical atomistic individual concep-
tion , and then advance an alternative , viable conception of the individual 
as socially embedded, which supports values contrary to those I fear are 
set to emerge in the new research programs in economics in the wake of 
the breakdown of the atomistic conception. My point of entry is personal 
identity analysis applied to the conception of the individual in economics 
(Davis 2003). 
The first and second sections of the chapter use personal identity analy-
sis to examine the traditional neoclassical and socially embedded indi-
vidual conceptions respectively. The balance examines the normative 
implications of the socially embedded individual conception in a discus-
sion I characterize as an investigation of " the normative significance of the 
individual." The third section interprets personal identity in terms of 
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personal integrity, and then takes up the connection be tween personal 
integrity and dignity. Dignity is thus first explained in its personal aspect in 
terms of the sense of self-esteem or pride individuals may possess. But 
dignity also has a closely associated social aspect that involves the basis 
society provides for this sense of dignity individuals may possess. The 
chapter 's fourth section examines dignity in relation to self-respect, and 
specifically in terms of the Kantian idea that human dignity depends upon 
having a capacity for claiming human rights. The fifth section turns to 
social-economic policy, and discusses the idea of a decent society as one 
which does not undermine human dignity through the existence of institu-
tions that humiliate individu;!ls. The fin ;!1 section ends with a comment OD 
the current phase of the fact-value distinction in economics. 
The neoclassical atomistic individual conception 
The neoclassical conception of the individual is subjectivist in defining the 
individual as no more than a collection of prefere·nces. The idea that indi-
viduals are atomistic beings - or that their individuality is a matter of what 
they are aparl from others rather than what they are in relalion to others-
follows from the form this subjectivism takes that requires that prefer-
ences are always the individual's own preferences and no one else's prefer-
ences. I have previously argued that the "own preferences" definition of 
the individual is circular and vacuous, and that it cannot establish that 
individuals are separate and distinct beings (Davis 2003: ch. 3). Establish-
ing that individuals are separate and distinct beings involves successfully 
addressing the first of two tests I have argued any conception of an indi-
vidual must pass in order to provide a viable account of personal identity 
in economics. I termed this test the individuation test , and then further 
required that any viable conception of the individual also be able to satisfy 
what I termed the re-identification test - the idea that for whatever the 
conception of the individual at issue one must also be able to show that the 
individual thus understood is re-identifiable across change. 
I will not review my arguments regarding why the neoclassical subjec-
tivist conception of the individual fails both the individuation and re-
identification tests, and does so in ways that seem in principle 
irremediable. Rather, here I simply focus upon how I believe the subjec-
tivist conception has failed - a failure, interestingly, that is largely 
accepted by many contemporary mainstream economists - and what the 
implications of this failure are for the destruction of traditional neoclassi-
cal values. The main point is that the neoclassical conception that made 
individual distinctness or independence depend on understanding indi-
viduals subjectively also eliminated this very basis on which individuals 
were seen to be distinct from one another. Thus, the representation of 
choice now dominant in economics, which involves nothing more than 
maximization of a formal objective function, applies equally well to any 
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lype of agent, whether it be the single indiv!dual, a coll.ection of individuals, 
an animal or collectIOn of ammals, non-hvmg machmes programmed to 
implement maximizing operations, or even cyborg agents made up of an 
amalgam of living, non-living, human and animal parts (Mirowski 2002). 
Alternatively, there is nothing in the current understanding of choice that 
req uires it apply to any type of agent in particular. In effect, then, 
contemporary economics has lost its criteria for distinguishing human indi-
viduals or indeed any types of agents as distinct and independent beings. 
The moral values this development destroys are individual sovereignty 
over choice, freedom as associated with choice, and the idea of the indi-
vid ual as a mora l center of the econom y. For all the complaints (me may 
have against neoclassicism and against the promotion of these values to 
the exclusion of other equally important moral values, these values have 
been historically progressive and essential to the modern ideals of demo-
cratic society. But current mainstream economics is no longer in a position 
to defend and promote these values, because it has abandoned its former 
theoretical basis for understanding individuals as distinct independent 
beings. What values , then, might the current destructive phase of the 
fact-value charade be about to put in the place of these? Of course, it is 
necessary to be speculative about this, but we might begin by asking what 
failing to distinguish between human individuals and machines implies. Or 
we might ask what simply failing to distinguish between different distinct 
human beings implies. A systems-based rationality that lacks any ontology 
of human individuals and that advances vague ideas of the "greatest good" 
may ultimately frame the way in which moral values for economics are 
elabora ted in the future. Moral systems that invest no moral significance in 
individuals are no stranger to the twentieth century, and have often been 
associated with to talitarian politica l systems. Neoclassical economics, with 
its emphasis on individual choice, has generally contested these systems, 
despite its beginnings in utilitarianism, which has sometimes served as a 
prop to authoritarian political views. The rise of "scientific" formalist eco-
nomics within the body of neoclassical economics in the last two decades, 
however, seems to signal the end of this defense of the individual as nor-
mat ively significant. I do not mean to say that current mainstream eco-
nomics or economists are authoritarian, merely that they no longer offer a 
defense of individuals as they once did. 
r hope these very brief rem arks help to make apparent why I have 
emphasized th e importance of the concept of personal identity in eco-
nomics. The applicability of the concept to the field is not immediately 
obvious (Davis 2003). What I wish to emphasize here is the close relation 
between one's conception of the individual, or lack of one, and the norm-
ative views one thinks appropriate to understanding economic life. From 
this perspective, the breakdown of the neoclassical conception of the indi-
vidual is accordingly not just central to understanding economics' status as 
a science, but also central to understanding the normative posture of 
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economics in contemporary society. Thus, in what follows, I seek to fill the 
gap left by the slide of neoclassical economics into a new agent-ambiguous 
mainstream economics by setting out a possible alternative future for eco-
nomics and its normative agendas based on an alternative conception of 
the individual associated with heterodox economics. 
The heterodox socially embedded individual conception 
The heterodox conception I employ - taken to retlect a number of differ-
ent contemporary approaches - explains individuals' personal identities 
non-subjectively in terms of relationships between individuals. Individuals 
are socially embedded in their relations to others, and this is what para-
doxically creates their individuality, independence, or distinctness. I say 
"paradoxically" because many heterodox economists are skeptical that 
there even is a conception of the individual as a distinct being appropriate 
to heterodox economics, rather arguing that the broad sweep of the tradi-
tion is holist, and that individuals play but a modesT role in understanding 
social forces and institutions. Thus, the first step in laying out the socially 
embedded individual conception is to show how individuals understood in 
this way can indeed be individuated or distinguished from one another, or 
pass what I call the individuation test. Two related but slightly different 
ways of showing this involve emphasizing individuals ' capacity for forming 
collective intentions (Davis 2002, 2003) and their capacity for forming 
commitments to others (Davis forthcoming). 
Collective intentionality and individuation 
Collective intentionality analysis is the theory of how individuals form 
intentions when using first-person plural or "we" speech (Gilbert 1989; 
Tuomela 1995). Philosophers have traditionally explained individual inten-
tions as if they were always formulated in first-person singular or "I" 
speech terms (e.g., Anscombe 1979), but of course "we" speech is as 
prevalent as " I" speech, and individuals clearly express intentions using 
"we" speech. What is interesting about "we" speech as compared to "I" 
speech, however, is its more demanding success conditions. When an indi-
vidual says to others, "we will do such-and-such," it is incumbent upon 
that individual to gauge whether others will go along with what has been 
said. In contrast, "I" speech is easier, since it is only the individual's own 
intention that is involved, and thus the main burden is simply on effective 
communication. 
It should be emphasized that in both cases, however, we are only 
talking about individual intentions. That is, a we-intention is not a group 
intention, since properly speaking groups are not cognitive beings that can 
form intentions. A we-intention, rather, is an individual's expression of an 
intention which that individual ascribes to a group in using "we" language 
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in reference to members of that group. To get a sense of what this means 
for thinking of individuals as socially embedded, note that whereas we 
might thus say that an older holistic tradition explains the social nature of 
individuals by embedding individuals in social relations, the non-holistic 
we-intention approach makes it possible to explain the social nature of 
individuals by embedding social relations in individuals. What, then , is the 
significance of this for thinking about the personal identity of socially 
embedded individuals? 
When individuals successfully express we-intentions, they apparently do 
twO quite different things at one and the same time. On the one hand, they 
constrain themselves by adjusting what they say to incorporate how others 
look upon whatever their shared we-intention is about. On the other hand, 
they engage in this self-constraining behavior freely in virtue of the fact 
that intentional behavior is always free behavior. (It makes no sense to say 
someone else can make me intend something.) Of course , one can be 
involuntarily constrained by others, but only individuals can freely con-
strain themselves. Recall , then , that the first personal identity test, the 
individuation test, requires that , for any conception of the individual , it 
must be possible to show that individuals thus understood are distinct 
from one another. This test is satisfied for the we-intention interpretation 
of the socially embedded individual conception. When individuals express 
we-intentions, and freely constrain themselves, they effectively self-
individuate themselves or self-distinguish themselves from others. We 
might understand this to occur at two levels. First, when individuals 
merely consider expressing a we-intention, they single out and compare 
themselves to those to whom their expression of a we-intention would 
apply. Second, their actual expression of a we-intention has a performative 
quality in the effect it has of distinguishing themselves in relation to those 
to whom it applies. Thus, the way in which individuals are members of 
social groups explains how they sustain individuality in those groups. 
Commitment and individuation 
A parallel argument regarding how socially embedded individuals can be 
shown to be distinct from one another can be elicited from Amartya Sen's 
conception of the individual who makes commitments to others, which he 
associates with a "self-scrutinizing and reasoning" aspect of the self (Sen 
1985, 2002; see, for example, Davis forthcoming). Since his well-known 
"Rational Fools" paper, Sen (1977) has argued that individuals have a 
special capacity for forming commitments to others, and that the exercise 
of this capacity is unrelated to the satisfaction of their own welfare goals. 
Commitment, I thus suggest, operates in much the same way as indi-
viduals' expression of we-intentions in that when individuals make com-
mitments to others they bind themselves by those commitments yet do so 
freely. As with we-intentions, others cannot force an individual to make a 
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genuine commitment; only individuals themselves can make genuine com-
mitments. Thus, Sen's "self-scrutinizing and reasoning" conception of the 
individual is one in which individuals also self-individuate themselves, and 
pass the individuation test. Sen's individual is a socially embedded one in 
that it involves individuals being independent and distinct precisely in virtue 
of their capacity to make commitments that tie them to others (Sen 1999). 
The re-identification test 
Passing the individuation test, however, is only half of what is required for 
establishing whether a particular conception of the individual explains per-
sonal identity. Also required is that an individual seen to be distinct in 
some way can also be shown to be re-identifiable in that same respect 
through a process of change. Thus, if we take individuals to be distinct and 
independent beings in virtue of their having a capacity to express we-
intentions or form commitments, do they indeed sustain this capacity 
across the change in their lives? One way we may-understand this process 
of change that is specifically appropriate to seeing individuals as socially 
embedded is in terms of the constant variation in one's social affiliations 
with others. Individuals are embedded in an almost endless variety of 
social affiliations over their lifetimes, and it is accordingly fair to ask 
whether they sustain a capacity to freely express we-intentions or form 
commitments to others, or rather come to do these things unfreely, and 
thus become "oversocialized" (Granovetter 1985) beings who fail to self-
individuate themselves over time. What I am referring to is whether indi-
viduals retain a special kind of freedom specifically reflective of their being 
social beings. Freedom has often been defined in negative terms of the 
individual's independence from others; here freedom is rather defined in 
positive terms of the individual's relation to others. If individuals sustain 
this specific type of freedom over their lifetimes in the sense of at least 
being able to regularly exercise it, then on the analysis here they may be 
said to have personal identities over their lifetimes. 
I think, however, that a fair evaluation of the state of many individuals 
in the world today leads to the conclusion that many people are not able to 
regularly exercise this kind of freedom across their lives' many changing 
social affiliations. They are, as it were , gradually beaten down by pressures 
from others to conform to group dictates, and thus become "oversocial-
ized" beings who increasingly fail to freely use "we" speech and form 
genuine commitments to others. They use the language of "we," but not 
freely; they may claim to make commitments, but really follow the lead of 
others. In effect, their native capacity to do these things does not develop 
into a sustainable capability that would justify our attributing personal 
identities to them. In the case of the embedded individual conception, 
whether or not individuals actually have personal identities, I thus argue, 
is contingent upon the way the social world is organized, specifically on 
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whether social relationships in all their variety are generally organized so 
as to promote individuals developing a capability to freely express we-
intentions and form commitments across their continually changing and 
diverse social connections. The embedded individual conception thus pro-
vides us with an understanding of personal identity as an individual poten-
tial, then , but does not guarantee that individuals will actually be able to 
have personal identities. This implies that on this conception of the indi-
vidual , personal identity becomes an object of social-economic policy. 
In order to be more concrete about what this policy might involve, in 
the balance of the discussion here, I accordingly set out which moral 
values underlie this particular conception of the individual as a socially 
embedded being. I understand this project as a characteristically social 
economic one, in that those who may be placed in this tradition have con-
sistently distinguished themselves from other economists, both heterodox 
and orthodox, in their enduring concern with the nature of the individual 
and the normative significance of the individual in economics (e.g., 
O'Boyle 1998; Lutz 1999; George 2001; Danner 2002; van Staveren 2001). 
By "normative significance of the individual in economics" I mean those 
values specifically associated with the moral autonomy and dignity of indi-
viduals in economic life, together with the implications which these values 
possess for our thinking about the organization and moral character of 
economic systems. A special concern with the normative significance of 
the individual in economics, then, represents one particular entry point 
into the normative evaluation of economics and economic life. I have 
chosen this particular entry point because it is my judgment that modern 
history has made the individual a moral focus, and because that moral 
focus may be in jeopardy at the current point in time - certainly in eco-
nomics and perhaps more widely. From this overall perspective, my exami-
nation of personal identity in economics is meant to provide a systematic 
foundation for investigating the normative significance of the individual in 
economics. Essentially, until one has a viable conception of the individual, 
it seems that one's investigation of the individual's normative significance 
must be limited and incomplete. However, I believe the socially embedded 
individual conception advanced above provides a viable conception of the 
individual, and thus in the following sections I outline a structure of norm-
ative ideas that hopefully begins to provide a more complete account of 
the normative significance of the individual based on this particular con-
ception. The subjects I take up are: integrity and dignity, dignity and self-
respect, and the idea of a decent society. 
Integrity and dignity 
A distinction can be made between personal integrity and moral integrity, 
where personal integrity refers to the coherence of a person's character, 
and moral integrity refers to whether a person's character is virtuous 
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(McFall 1987). Personal integrity appears more fundamental than moral 
integrity in that moral integrity presupposes personal integrity, and one 
can have a personal integrity without having moral integrity. Here I am 
first interested in personal integrity as close in meaning to the idea of per-
sonal identity. Personal identity, as I have explained it in connection with 
the socially embedded individual conception, concerns whether individuals 
are able to maintain a distinctness or independence across their many, dif-
ferently demanding social relationships. We may understand this to be a 
matter of personal integrity if distinctness from others also involves indi-
viduals having an internal coherence. Conversely, individuals who lose this 
internal coherence, though they may still have personal identities in terms 
of having a sustained capacity for expressing we-intentions and forming 
commitments, may be fragmented and center-less. Personal integrity, it 
might thus be said, is a somewhat stronger way of looking at personal 
identity as if from the inside out, or in terms of how one's relations and 
commitments to others cohere with one another from the point of view of 
individuals themselves. 
One influential interpre tation of personal integrity as internal coher-
ence is that of Henry Frankfurt who sees persons as having personal 
integrity when they are able to regulate their first-order desires by their 
second- or higher-order desires (Frankfurt 1971). Individuals' internal 
coherence on this view is a matter of their having a unitary, hierarchical 
organization to their different, possibly competing desires. Another 
leading interpretation of personal integrity as internal coherence that is 
closer to the identity approach here is Bernard Williams' understanding of 
personal integrity as the product of individuals' identity-conferring com-
mitments (Williams 1973, 1981). Individuals make various commitments to 
others (sometimes just to various social causes), and this gives them each a 
personal integrity in terms of those commitments with which they identify 
most strongly. Further, when an individual's different commitments con-
flict, the stronger ones dominate , and these then become the commitments 
responsible for conferring a sense of identity on the individual. Note, then, 
how Frankfurt and Williams' understanding of personal integrity as under-
lying identity helps expand our personal identity view of individuals as 
active beings. On that view, individuals are active beings in having a capac-
ity for expressing we-intentions and forming commitments to others. But 
from the Frankfurt-Williams personal integrity perspective, this capacity 
should also be seen as simultaneously at work in individuals' construction 
of or conferral of personal identities upon themselves. 
Personal identity, then, is not just something that can only be seen from 
the inside out, or from the point of view of individuals themselves in terms 
of their sense of what coherence or personal integrity they mayor may not 
possess. Individuals actively invest in their personal integrity by way of the 
ties and commitments they make to others, and thereby engage in a kind 
of reflexive self-construction of themselves. This can be reasonably inter-
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preted to include the idea that they are always in a process of self-
evaluation - or "self-scrutiny" as Sen puts it (1985, 2002) - since any 
process of self-construction presumably needs some sort of accompanying 
stocktaking activity in which one forms a view of oneself in order to evalu-
ate the effects of one's actions upon one's identity. Put differently, when 
individuals are engaged in actions that affect their identities, their accom-
panying self-evaluation or self-scrutiny provides them an understanding of 
themselves, or makes them retJexively conscious of themselves. That is, 
they acquire a self-consciousness. 
This sense of self that individuals have provides a basis for how we might 
think about individual dignity. The concept of dignity is central to many 
contemporary views regarding the moral autonomy and independence of 
the individual, but is often not very clearly explained. One complication in 
explaining dignity is that it has both a personal aspect and a social aspect 
which are linked together in a manner that is not immediately transparent. 
Thus, it is one thing to speak of individuals having a sense of dignity, and 
another, though nonetheless related thing to speak of there being a social 
basis for their having a sense of dignity. Avishai Margalit suggests one way 
of linking these two aspects of dignity in terms of the concepts of self-esteem 
and self-respect: "Dignity is similar to pride. Pride is the expression of self-
esteem; dignity is the expression of the feeling of respect persons feel 
toward themselves as human beings. Dignity constitutes the external aspect 
of self-respect" (1996: 51). Dignity, pride, and self-esteem are similar on the 
personal level. But elsewhere Margalit goes on to distinguish self-esteem 
and self-respect, arguing that "self-esteem is a ranking concept [that] relies 
on the beliefs people have about their own achievements," while self-respect 
is a matter of "belonging" which one has in virtue of some social member-
ship (Margalit 1996: 46-7). Thus, self-esteem is a matter of one's own 
opinion and feelings about oneself as compared to others, while self-respect 
is a matter of how one believes one is entitled to regard oneself in virtue of 
being an equal member of some social constituency. That is, self-esteem is 
better associated with the personal aspect of dignity, while self-respect is 
better associated with the social aspect of dignity. Indeed, self-esteem and 
self-respect do not always go hand-in-hand in that one might have the one 
without the other (Sachs 1981).1 But one important basis for individuals 
having pride, dignity, and self-esteem, as Margalit indicates in the passage 
above, is whether they feel entitled to self-respect. That is, the social side of 
dignity underlies and supports the personal, self-esteem side. This thus 
necessitates our giving special attention to the social side of dignity in terms 
of its basis in the concept of self-respect. 
Dignity and self-respect 
According to most commentators, when we speak of self-respect in terms 
of how one is entitled to regard oneself in virtue of being an equal member 
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of some social constituency, we enter the social normative domain of 
human rights. Immanuel Kant is a main source of this understanding as, 
for example, when he states that "the dignity of humanity" requires that 
we not "suffer [our] rights to be trampled underfoot by others with 
impunity" (Kant 1983 [1797]: 99). The principle continues to be widely 
accepted, and is central to much thinking about human dignity today. For 
example, the United Nations (UN) "Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights" associates dignity and human rights by beginning with a mutual 
" recognition of the inherent dignity and ... the equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family" (United Nations 1948). Why, 
then, does having certain fundamental rights make it possible for one to 
have dignity and self-respect? 
Joel Feinberg sets out the basic case for this connection, first in terms of 
the personal side of dignity and then in terms of its social side. In the 
former respect, "the activity of claiming" one's rights, Feinberg argues, is 
what gives individuals a sense of personal dignity, and leads to their 
expression of this sense of dignity (Feinberg 191D: 257). But, of course, 
individuals are not always active in claiming their rights, and, more seri-
ously, barriers may also exist to their claiming their rights. Thus, to fully 
understand human dignity one must go beyond whether individuals simply 
express claims to their rights to also speak of individuals having some 
socially "recognizable capacity" to assert claim to their rights. "What is 
called 'human dignity' may simply be the recognizable capacity to assert 
claims. To respect a person, then, or to think of him as possessed of human 
dignity, simply is to think of him as a potential maker of claims" (Feinbel'g 
1970: 252). Being invested with a capacity to make claims of one's rights, 
moreover, is the product of a social arrangement that makes the individual 
a member of a community. Not only must a system of rights be in place, 
but they must also be guaranteed to all individuals to whom they apply if 
we are to say individuals have a capacity to claim their rights. Social mem-
bership as an established or institutionalized status thus underlies the 
capacity to make rights claims, plus the self-respect which then flows from 
this capacity, and finally the sense of dignity individuals possess as a result. 
One mark or sign of whether individuals have this capacity, feel self-
respect, and maintain a sense of dignity is whether individuals feel resent-
ment or indignation should they be unfairly treated by others or have their 
rights infringed. Resentment and indignation, from this perspective, are 
socially justified feelings of outrage experienced by individuals who have 
an accepted status as members of a community with rights in that 
community. 
Human dignity, therefore, involves a self-respect that comes of being an 
accepted member of a community equal in certain basic rights. Returning 
to the issue of individuals' personal identity in economic life, possessing 
dignity and self-respect, we may now add, involves individuals having a 
personal integrity. Individuals have a personal integrity to the extent that 
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they are able to organize and create an internal coherence for themselves 
in their changing and varied interactions with others. In ordinary ways of 
speaking, they are typically said to be self-directed and in a state of self-
control. Certainly this sort of quality is additionally needed to fully 
describe human dignity (Meyer 1989). Of course there have always been 
individuals who are self-directed and in self-control without having the 
benefits associated with being accepted members of a community (having 
rights that justify self-respect and help create a sense of dignity). However, 
such individuals usually have a stoic quality about them that tends to be 
rare and exceptional. More commonly, individuals are self-directed and in 
self-control when they have the self-respect and dignity that comes of 
having established rights in a community. Thus, to make having a personal 
identity an object of social-economic policy requires that we think of this 
identity in terms of individuals having a personal integrity supported by a 
system of rights that generates self-respect and human dignity. 
Let me therefore summarize from all this what seem to be the main ele-
ments involved in a normative focus on the individual in economics. First, 
to make the individual a focus at all requires we operate with a satisfactory 
conception of the individual, where in personal identity terms this is a 
matter of how individuals may be seen to be sustainably distinct beings. 
Socially embedded individuals may be seen to be sustainably distinct in 
virtue of possessing a self-individuating capacity for expressing we-
intentions and forming commitments to others. What this personal identity 
view isolates in specifically normative terms is a special kind of freedom 
exercised across one's lifetime of many changing social affiliations. 
Second, when we think of personal identity as personal integrity, we 
suppose that being an individual also involves having an internal coher-
ence. Having a sense of the internal coherence in one's life in turn gives 
the individual a sense of dignity. Integrity thus introduces dignity as a 
second value in the normative characterization of the individual. Third, 
however, whether individuals have dignity depends very much on whether 
they feel justified in this regard, and this is a matter of whether they have a 
socially accepted capacity to claim rights. Dignity in this regard is a matter 
of having justified self-respect. Human rights thus constitute the third key 
value associated with a normative characterization of the individual. 
Therefore, for the socially embedded individual conception, freedom, 
dignity, and human rights produce a structure of values that provide an 
account of the moral autonomy and independence of the individual. 
Central to this conception of the individual is the idea that individuals are 
able to reflexively engage in a process of self-evaluation whereby their 
object of attention is themselves as subjects. In normative terms, this 
rel1exivity takes the form of dignity that constitutes the value link between 
the values of freedom and human rights. Dignity is a rel1exive concept 
both in its personal aspect as self-esteem or pride and in its social aspect as 
self-respect. The former arises out of personal identity, freedom, and 
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personal integrity; the latter arises out of membership in a community and 
human rights. The three values together explain the normative significance 
of the individual , but dignity plays the central role. 
Dignity and the idea of a decent society 
To say that dignity is a central value is also to identify a normative point of 
entry for social-economic policy. In neoclassical and current mainstream 
economics, efficiency is the normative point of entry that guides policy 
prescription. The goal of efficiency recommendations is of course to elimi-
nate inefficiency. What, then , is the goal of policy recommendations that 
make dignity a central value standing between freedom and human rights? 
Conversely, what is it that we wish to eliminate in the interest of promot-
ing human dignity? Margalit (1996) deflnes humiliation as the violation of 
human dignity, and deflnes a decent society as one whose institutions do 
not humiliate people. In contrast, a civilized society is one in which people 
do not humiliate other people , and violate their diifnity. A civilized society 
is of course to be preferred to a decent society, but realism recommends 
we make at least decent societies our aim, and thereby focus on the cre-
ation of non-humiliating, dignity-enhancing institutions if we are to make 
the moral autonomy and independence of the individual central to our 
normative thinking about economics. 
What, then, does humiliation involve? If we think in terms of its mani-
fest effects on individuals, we might begin by noting that when individuals 
are humiliated they are made to feel ashamed or caused to have a sense of 
shame about themselves. That is, humiliation targets individuals ' pride and 
self-esteem. But I suggest that systematic humiliation , as the product of a 
set of social institutions, has a deeper object, namely, reducing individuals' 
self-respect. Self-respect , recall , has its basis in the status of belonging and 
membership in a community, whereas self-esteem is a function of how 
individuals see themselves relative to others (Margalit 1996: 46-7). 
Accordingly, institutions that humiliate individuals, such as systems of 
racial or ethnic discrimination , or household structures that are gender-
biased, have the effect of denying individuals membership in a community 
or reducing their status in a community - in their own eyes. Of course, 
some stoic individuals may maintain a sense of self-esteem despite the 
existence of humiliating institutions. But assuming that self-esteem for 
most individuals depends in important ways on their community status and 
thus on their self-respect, humiliating institutions work to undermine 
human dignity by attacking most individuals' self-regard in this most fun-
damental way. 
Put in terms of personal identity, humiliating institutions undermine 
individuals' personal integrity or their sense of identity. I argued above 
that , on the socially embedded individual conception, whether individuals 
have personal identities is a matter of whether they are able to sustain a 
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capacity (have a capability) to freely constrain themse lves to the terms of 
participation in the many social groups to which they belong. Humiliating 
institutions , then, by attacking individuals ' self-respect, also work to 
undermine individuals having personal identities. Or, since having a per-
sonal identity invo lves being able to exercise freedom in this way, a system 
of humiliation also works to limit individual freedom. Socie ties, of course, 
have many institutions. The character of a society, accordingly, can be 
seen to be a matter of the balance of humili ating and non-humiliating 
institutions it possesses, and the extent to which a society's institutions 
humiliate individuals can be seen to be a ma tter o f the number and sever-
it y of humiliating institutions it possesses. 
Making human dignity a centra l value of social-economic policy, then , 
means changing social institutions to elimina te humiliating institutions. In 
this respect, a dignity-based social-economic policy is like efficiency-based 
policy, since bo th aim to change institutional arrangements. But a dignity-
based social-economic policy involves a more complex value structure in 
th at it combines a specific kind of freedom necessary to pe rsonal identity 
and personal integrity with a reliance on human rights as a guarantee of 
community membership. There are advantages and disadvantages to 
operating with a more complex value structure such as this. The main dis-
advantage is the simple appeal that one-dimensional efficiency recommen-
dations offer is no t available when we focus on human dignity. The main 
adva ntage is that emphasizing hum an dignity enables us to begin with a 
key res ult o f mode rn history regarding what is normatively important in 
hum an society - namely, the dignity and moral autonomy of individuals -
and then understand the logic behind that result in a reasonabl y pe rsua-
sive way. Having a reasonably persuasive way of understanding the norm-
ati ve importance of the dignity and moral a utonomy of individuals, it 
seems, may be particul arly important at the current time in history if one 
principal defender of the individual - neoclassical economics - is either 
giving up that defense or leaving the stage altogether. With these conclu-
sions in mind, I return to the fact- value distinction to comment on its 
current phase and possible future. 
The creative phase of the fact-value distinction 
While heterodox economists might hope that mainstream economics will dis-
abuse itself of the fact-value distinction in the future , a more realistic view is 
to suppose that it will remain in good standing for the majority of economists. 
Thus, I suggest that the more important work for heterodox economists is to 
work to counter the logic of the distinction by emphasizing the value commit-
ments of economics, and contesting them where they are unacceptable . 
Today this means exposing the " turn in economics" (D avis forthcoming) by 
charting the new directions economics is currently taking, and then exhibiting 
the new value commitments these new directions involve. I suggested at the 
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outset that the new directions economics is currently taking involve a 
destructive phase of the fact-value distinction in the undermining of old neo-
classical value commitments. This process is really the obverse of a new cre-
ative phase in which new value commitments appropriate to a new 
economics will be elaborated. But just as the new directions in economics are 
yet to become very clear, so the value commitments that will attend these 
new directions are also ye t to become very clear. 
This stage in the development of economics thus seems to offer 
opportunities to those who reject the mainstream economics vision, since in 
the emerging mainstream value-interregnum there exis ts space for promo-
tion of social values that are arguably more humane and more in keeping 
with a fuller normative understanding of economic life. My arguments here 
make the individual an entry point, first in terms of personal identity analy-
sis and second in terms of a focus on dignity as a central value. This focus is 
in part strategic, since neoclassical economics has enjoyed a wider appeal for 
years in virtue of its emphasis on the individual. Heterodox economists of 
course reject the neoclassical view conception of rhe individual, but more 
important it seems to me is mainstream economics' increasing lack of inter-
est, even abandonment of individuals as a conceptual and normative focus. 
The heterodox opportunity, then, is to take over the individual as a focus, 
though on terms that are (normatively) more acceptable. To the extent that 
the wider appeal of economics is in its defense of the individual, it may be 
that the coming creative phase of the fact-value distinction may be success-
fully built upon a genuinely comprehensive understanding of individuals, 
rather than upon a vision of society in which individuals do not count. 
Indeed , in such circumstances it might even transpire that economists will 
come to question the fact-value distinction itself. 
Note 
This is suggested in the often ambiguous use of the term "pride," as when 
people say they take no pride in something, but nonetheless have their pride. 
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